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Introduction
The race is hardly responsible for French depopulation 
because, far away from the metropole and the artificial 
influence of civilization and customs, French people 
once again become prolific.
—Charles Raisin, La dépopulation  
de la France, 1900
French defeat in the Franco- Prussian War was swift; in less than two months of war, enemy troops had encircled Paris, captured the emperor Napoleon III, and left the government of the Sec-
ond Empire discredited. This humiliating defeat in 1870 resulted in 
the unification of Germany, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, the estab-
lishment of France’s Third Republic, and fears that France was on 
the brink of becoming a second- rate power in Europe. The crisis that 
gave birth to the Third Republic would influence its political history 
throughout its existence; in the immediate aftermath of the war, patri-
otic French men and women turned their attention to their empire, 
the declining birthrate in France, and the comparative demographic 
strengths of rival powers in Europe.
It was therefore in the early Third Republic that Malthusian argu-
ments in favor of fertility restraint were eclipsed by the growing belief 
that victory over Germany in the next war would require a higher 
birthrate. This conviction was shaped by statistical studies reveal-
ing the relatively slow growth of the French population over the 
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course of the nineteenth century. For example, France’s population 
grew by a mere 43 percent between 1800 and 1900; the population of 
the United Kingdom had increased by 164 percent during that same 
period.1 One of the principal causes of this inferior population growth 
was France’s modest birthrate, which, in 1888, stood at 23.1, in con-
trast to the birthrates of 36.7 and 36.6 reported in Germany and Italy 
that same year.2 Growing numbers of pronatalists studied the causes 
and consequences of depopulation, pursued a vocal propaganda cam-
paign, and convinced the government to pass legislation promoting 
population growth through a variety of means, including financial 
incentives, restrictions on women’s work, and protection of mother-
hood. In the twentieth century, pronatalists would work closely with 
the government in extra- parliamentary depopulation commissions in 
1902 and 1912; the Conseil supérieur de la natalité, formed in 1919 to 
advise the government on demographic matters; and the Haut comité 
de la population, created in 1939 to design new laws on the family and 
the birthrate.
As the trauma of the année terrible fueled the pronatalist movement 
in the first decades of the Third Republic, it simultaneously created 
a desire to overcome the humiliation of defeat by establishing a vast 
empire outside Europe. While commentators frequently described 
France’s earlier colonial expansion as “accidental,” there was nothing 
accidental about the colonial campaigns of the 1880s and 1890s when 
France acquired new territory in Africa and Southeast Asia, greatly 
expanding an empire that by World War I would be roughly twenty- 
five times the size of the metropole. In the late nineteenth century, 
colonial expansion and settlement enjoyed considerable support in 
France that extended beyond the usual colonial circles and impinged 
on political discussions that ostensibly had nothing to do with impe-
rialism. Though representing distinct political movements with few 
prominent members in common, the colonial lobby and pronatalist 
organizations of the early Third Republic were nevertheless born out 
of the same crisis and reflected similar anxieties concerning France’s 
trajectory and position in the world. As a result, the discourses of these 
two groups intersected and presented similar conclusions.
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This book explores that intersection by showing, first of all, that 
pronatalist ideas were an integral part of how colonial propagandists 
and administrators pursued their goals of establishing a strong French 
presence overseas and making colonies profitable. Pronatalism influ-
enced how the Union coloniale française recruited people for settle-
ment; pronatalist thinking led governors in places like Madagascar 
to try to make their colonies more profitable through state- controlled 
population growth and managing colonial subjects’ reproduction; in 
large settler colonies such as those in North Africa, colonial govern-
ments considered pronatalist policies designed to encourage repro-
duction and support settler families to be essential to establishing 
a strong and permanent French presence. Second, this book details 
how demographic thinking about empire shaped pronatalists’ strate-
gies and their proposed solutions to depopulation. In the early Third 
Republic, many social scientists saw colonial settlement schemes as a 
medical question based on a sophisticated understanding of demog-
raphy, race, and acclimatization, a body of knowledge that would 
determine whether or not the French could reproduce adequately in 
the colonies. While many late- nineteenth- century experts outside 
pronatalist circles produced pessimistic assessments of French pros-
pects for establishing large settler colonies, those prominent statis-
ticians and demographers directly engaged in questions relating to 
depopulation were among the vocal advocates of French colonial set-
tlement in the 1870s. As the pronatalist movement became more orga-
nized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pronatalists 
increasingly understood their demographic crisis in terms that tran-
scended the boundaries of the metropole and positioned their empire 
as a key component in their nation’s regeneration. In short, not only 
were French pronatalists aware of France’s empire, but they empha-
sized the potential demographic benefits of colonial settlement, stud-
ied the pronatalist initiatives of colonial governments seeking to make 
settler colonialism viable, and collaborated with analogous organiza-
tions in the settler communities. By incorporating sources from both 
the metropole and empire, including familialist journals from French 
settlers in North Africa as well as archival material specific to colonial 
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pronatalist policies, this book explores precisely why pronatalists came 
to believe that the maintenance of a large empire with settler colonies 
would be central to establishing demographic growth and strength.
Until recently, many historians underestimated the significance of 
empire in metropolitan France and instead posited that prior to decol-
onization the French public’s interest in empire was fickle at best.3 
Along similar lines, other scholars have argued that over the course 
of the Third Republic, the French public became increasingly aware 
of their empire but rallied around it only in times of crisis, such as in 
1914 and 1939.4 More recently, as part of the “imperial turn,” schol-
ars such as Gary Wilder have discredited the image of Third Repub-
lic France as “simply a self- contained parliamentary republic that also 
happened to possess overseas colonies.”5 In particular, historians have 
been interested in examining the significance of empire to daily life 
in France, concluding that it was neither remote nor irrelevant but, 
rather, figured prominently in the French imagination. For instance, 
recent studies have analyzed the images of empire and the colonial 
“other” that flooded the metropole in films, the penny press, adver-
tisements, and postcards.6 Colonial exhibitions such as those of 1889 
and 1931 speak of the popular fascination with the empire and its peo-
ple.7 In the twentieth century, the colonial encounter was no longer 
even limited to those travelers who ventured into the empire or visited 
colonial exhibits in the cities; it also occurred in factories, brothels, 
cafés, and the streets of cities as large numbers of colonial migrants 
arrived to fill the labor shortage, serve in the army, or attend univer-
sity.8 Collectively, these examples of colonial encounters and colonial 
consciousness ranged from the spectacular to the quotidian, revealing 
the interconnectedness of metropole and empire. They further suggest 
that, political and economic considerations aside, French people were 
not only aware of empire, but many encountered it on a regular basis.
Although historians have convincingly portrayed public interest in 
empire during the Third Republic in terms of its impact on mass cul-
ture, few studies explore how this phenomenon in turn affected polit-
ical movements that lacked any direct connection to empire.9 In his 
study of French imperialism between the world wars, Martin Thomas 
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explores public perceptions of empire among a group of people he dubs 
the “imperial community.”10 Moving beyond official colonial circles, 
such as the colonial lobby, Thomas applies the label “imperial com-
munity” to a group of people consisting of “politicians, bureaucrats, 
colonial administrators, manufacturers, traders, media commenta-
tors, educators, missionaries, lobbyists and settlers that dominated 
the political discourse of empire after the First World War.”11 This 
book demonstrates that while French pronatalists were concerned 
with political issues of a primarily metropolitan nature, namely, the 
national birthrate, their engagement with this question nevertheless 
brought them to discussions of empire that placed them clearly in the 
“imperial community.” Visions of empire were so pervasive in France 
during this period that pronatalists looked well beyond the borders 
of the metropole as they imagined solutions to what would, at first 
glance, be construed as a strictly metropolitan problem.
The first English- language historical study to address France’s cri-
sis of depopulation was that of Joseph Spengler, written in 1938.12 An 
economics professor at Duke University, Spengler began his study 
by situating this historical topic in the politics of his day. He argued 
that “within the next quarter century true depopulation— a persistent 
long- run excess of deaths over births— will manifest itself in nearly 
all the countries of Europe and in those non- European countries to 
which Western civilization has spread.”13 Spengler detailed the demo-
graphic trends over the last few centuries, providing a number of 
explanations for the low birthrate and echoing the arguments made 
by French pronatalists. Like pronatalists, Spengler attributed the low 
fertility rate to many factors, including urbanization, military ser-
vice, women’s work, and the desire for social mobility. More recent 
scholars have returned to Spengler’s work when considering prona-
talism as part of their studies of sexuality, the woman question, fem-
inism, the crisis of masculinity, nationalism, immigration, and the 
rise of the welfare state. These studies collectively reveal the persua-
siveness and importance of pronatalist doctrine during this period 
and the fears that depopulation engendered.14 Departing from Spen-
gler, they rightly emphasize, moreover, that the anxiety surrounding 
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the birthrate reflected more than simply pronatalists’ stated fears of 
military defeat and economic ruin; pronatalism was also a response 
to concerns about gender identities and the changing roles of women 
and men in society.
Though demonstrating the far- reaching implications of demographic 
thinking in Third Republic France, scholars have thus far analyzed pro-
natalism within a specifically European context, focusing on France’s 
rivalry with Germany and making few references to the empire. The 
European focus most likely stems from the fact that fears of depopu-
lation initially gained momentum following a specifically European 
conflict, the Franco- Prussian War. In many other European states, 
by contrast, pronatalism developed in the context of colonial expan-
sion, and imperialism has consequently figured more prominently in 
historians’ assessments of the topic in other national contexts.15 Anna 
Davin’s article on British pronatalism, for example, positions the Boer 
War as a key event that gave rise to concerns about depopulation in 
Britain.16 In France, by contrast, the birthrate began declining at a 
much earlier date than in Britain and became a national crisis prior 
to the scramble for Africa and following a European conflict that had 
nothing to do with empire. As this book will show, French fears of 
depopulation, though born out of a European crisis, eventually evolved 
beyond such European rivalries to include empire.
When discussing French population growth, whether in France 
or in the colonies, race was central to how pronatalists made sense of 
the demographic crisis. In this respect, Alys Weinbaum’s concept of 
the “race/reproduction bind” serves as a useful reminder that repro-
duction and race are intricately connected.17 Applying this concept 
to France and French colonies, we can see that pronatalists were pri-
marily concerned with the relative strength of their nation, something 
that they measured with data on French reproduction and popula-
tion growth. A low birthrate among those they considered capable 
of transmitting French racial identity to the next generation would 
threaten the existing “social systems hierarchically organized accord-
ing to notions of inherent racial superiority, inferiority, and degenera-
tion.”18 Conversely, pronatalists would be inclined to interpret a high 
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birthrate among outsiders, particularly those residing on French soil, 
as the propagation of a rival social system with the potential to eclipse 
that of the French. It follows, therefore, that race and reproduction 
were intimately connected in these larger concerns about national 
strength and maintaining a particular social order.
Still, having established that French pronatalists saw reproduction 
in racial terms, it is necessary to consider what they meant when refer-
encing “the French race.” Though seemingly self- evident in meaning, 
the concept of “the French race” that regularly appeared in pronatalist 
literature was an inherently unstable category, changing over time and 
subject to conflicting interpretations. As historians have shown, the 
notion of a coherent French racial identity was partly complicated by 
the legacy of the French Revolution, which established shared culture, 
language, and territory as the central elements of national identity. 
Nineteenth- century theorist Ernest Renan was famous for empha-
sizing that constructs like race and ethnicity had nothing to do with 
defining the French nation; this was a voluntary and subjective form 
of nationalism that could be contrasted with the more biologically or 
racially based nationalism of Germany.19 Though willing to acknowl-
edge the impact of universalism on French ideas of national iden-
tity and citizenship, historians no longer accept this idea uncritically 
and have instead assessed the importance of race as a social marker 
in modern French history, despite official proclamations to the con-
trary.20 For the purposes of this study, it is essential to recognize that 
throughout the Third Republic race was an integral part of how pro-
natalists conceived of the French population as a unified entity and 
interpreted France’s demographic strength in relation to other popu-
lations. When discussing the need to increase the French population 
in France, pronatalists had very specific ideas about who was French, 
ideas that were guided by concepts of racial purity. For instance, after 
World War I, André Michelin, a pronatalist and major donor to the 
Alliance nationale, restricted family allowances to “French” employ-
ees at his company, denying such benefits to workers from elsewhere 
in Europe or the colonies.21 This policy exemplifies how pronatalist- 
minded Frenchmen such as Michelin saw reproduction in racial terms. 
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Michelin had no interest in encouraging foreigners residing and work-
ing in France to have more children, despite the fact that French natu-
ralization laws made it possible for some of these children to become 
French citizens, thereby adding to France’s overall population growth.22
While this would seem to suggest a hostile attitude to immigrants 
and foreign workers, this was not universally the case, as pronatal-
ists’ ideas about who could be French or contribute to French demo-
graphic strength were malleable, changing over time and differing from 
one context to another. The research of Elisa Camiscioli, in particu-
lar, has enlarged our understanding of how ideas of race intersected 
with gendered anxieties to shape pronatalist views on immigration 
following World War I.23 Camiscioli shows that despite the largely 
nationalist character of their movement, interwar pronatalists wel-
comed the assimilation of select European immigrants, most nota-
bly Italians, into the nation as a means of strengthening the race as a 
whole. Empire and, more specifically, colonized populations were not 
a central part of the immigration debate, as pronatalists vehemently 
opposed the immigration of people from Africa and Asia, whom they 
considered incapable of being assimilated and consequently adding to 
“French” demographic growth.24 Tyler Stovall notes, moreover, that 
it was the very presence on French soil of workers from the colonies 
that shaped evolving French views of “white” European immigrants 
after 1914. Contrasting the “white” racial identity of the latter workers 
with workers from the colonies, French immigration reformers were 
more receptive to the arrival of Italians and other Europeans whom 
they believed to have the requisite racial characteristics needed for 
assimilation and absorption into the French population.25
This book will show that even as pronatalists saw a potential dan-
ger in interactions between France and its colonies (namely, in the 
form of migration of colonial workers to the metropole), they by and 
large supported imperialism. This is because pronatalists believed 
that it was not enough to encourage French population growth solely 
within France’s borders; true demographic prowess entailed exten-
sive French settlement of the colonies and support for French families 
both in France and in the empire. Ultimately, by imagining France’s 
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regeneration within the larger context of empire, pronatalists moved 
toward more complex ideas about race and population growth more 
generally. For instance, pronatalist awareness of the superior birth-
rates exhibited by French populations in the empire prompted them 
to think differently about the concept of French racial decline and the 
impact of gender on the larger phenomenon of “race suicide.” Also 
illustrating pronatalists’ evolving racial thinking were their responses 
to pronatalist measures introduced in certain colonies. In some cases, 
as in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, pronatalist policies were focused 
almost exclusively on the French settler population. In Madagascar, on 
the other hand, where the settler population was relatively small, the 
colonial government introduced a different set of pronatalist measures 
aimed at decreasing mortality rates and increasing fertility among 
Malagasy subjects. Although the policies developed in Madagascar 
were strikingly different from those in North Africa, both in terms 
of their nature and origin as well as the racial composition of the 
populations at which they were directed, metropolitan pronatalists 
demonstrated strong interest in and support for both forms of colo-
nial pronatalism. Making sense of this response requires recognizing 
that colonial forms of pronatalism were premised on the idea that the 
future of the French empire depended on developing demographic 
resources, be it French settlers or select populations of colonial sub-
jects. As establishing and maintaining a strong empire was an objec-
tive that had everything to do with the depopulation crisis, it is clear 
that French pronatalism extended beyond a simple desire to increase 
the “French” population of France through a uniform set of measures.
Consequently, one major contribution of this book is the evidence 
it offers showing that pronatalists understood their demographic cri-
sis in global terms and positioned their empire as an essential part of 
the national regeneration they envisioned. That they thought about 
depopulation in global terms is also evident in their mixed response 
to fears of “race suicide” among their European rivals. While France’s 
population began declining at an earlier date than did the populations 
of neighboring European states, depopulation was not a uniquely 
French anxiety in the modern period. By the twentieth century most 
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states in Europe had likewise witnessed an appreciable decline in their 
population growths and developed policies aimed at improving the 
“quality and quantity” of their populations.26 In some states, such as 
Germany and Great Britain, governments introduced a more selec-
tive form of pronatalism by encouraging higher birthrates in certain 
segments of the population and, in Nazi Germany’s case, actively 
preventing the population growth of those they considered social 
undesirables.27 On the other hand, in Italy and Spain, fascist leaders 
Mussolini and Franco pursued pronatalist policies that more closely 
resembled those of France.28 Such distinctions aside, most European 
states in the twentieth century developed fears of degeneration and 
population decline that led to a variety of attempts to bring popula-
tion growth under state control.29
Pronatalists were well aware of such demographic concerns else-
where in Europe, and yet, for two reasons, this knowledge did little 
to assuage their fears of depopulation. First, pronatalists asserted that 
France remained at a numerical disadvantage because its depopulation 
crisis had emerged earlier than was the case elsewhere in Europe. Sec-
ond and more significantly, pronatalists were well aware that birthrates 
outside of Europe remained strong and feared that Europe’s position 
in the world was weakened by its relatively small population. Initially, 
pronatalists’ extra- European demographic concerns were more focused 
on Asian populations than on African and American populations. 
Throughout the Third Republic, discussions of le péril jaune (“yellow 
peril”) were evident in pronatalist literature and typically took one 
of two forms. On the one hand were fears that Asia’s population was 
so large that it would inevitably “overflow” into Europe and inundate 
Europe’s population.30 On the other were concerns that this demo-
graphic disparity left French and other European colonies in Asia par-
ticularly vulnerable.31 In this respect, Japan, widely believed to have 
designs on French Indochina as well as other European colonies in 
Asia, was seen as the most formidable threat.32 As both of these two 
responses to the “yellow peril” make clear, pronatalists presented this 
particular demographic threat both in terms of its implications for 
France and its threat to European or Western powers generally. Out-
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side France, nationalists in other European and Western countries 
were equally concerned about the rise of Japan and the mass migra-
tion of Asian workers in the nineteenth century. For instance, policy 
makers in the United States, Australia, and South Africa evoked the 
“yellow peril” when crafting restrictive laws designed to limit or pre-
vent Asian immigration.33
Despite the fact that this was a period of intense rivalry between 
major European countries and empires, and this competition repre-
sented much of the driving force behind French pronatalism, there 
was simultaneously a sense of a shared demographic crisis among 
rivals. Competitive impulses aside, French pronatalists identified with 
other Europeans as members of the same race and believed that inad-
equate “white” population growth in places like Britain or Germany 
had consequences for the race as a whole. One example of this sense 
of a shared “European” or even “white” demographic crisis is visible in 
a pronatalist brochure titled “The White Race in Danger of Death.”34 
Through graphs, illustrations, and statistical charts, the authors of 
this brochure sought to persuade the public that declining birthrates 
in other European countries gave French people little reason to cel-
ebrate; far from diminishing the nature of the crisis, this develop-
ment only made it more severe.35 Another revealing picture in the 
journal of the Alliance nationale depicted Japan as a large Asian man 
with an excess of 943,000 births over deaths in the year 1926; Britain, 
France, and Germany, however, had a combined excess of 823,000 
births over deaths that same year and were depicted collectively as a 
smaller European man (fig. 1). Underneath the picture, the caption 
explains: “The true ‘Yellow Peril’ will be born of Western European 
countries’ insufficient birthrate.”36 When considering the global ram-
ifications of French depopulation, the editors of the journal consid-
ered it more relevant to present the birthrates of these three European 
rivals as a group. In this way, as they promoted awareness of French 
depopulation, pronatalists simultaneously educated the public about 
similar developments elsewhere in Europe and linked France’s fate to 
that of other European states. By studying French pronatalists’ interest 
in empire and support for colonial settlement, this book further elu-
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cidates how pronatalists’ anxieties about a shared European depopu-
lation crisis could exist alongside the persistent demographic rivalry 
they felt with Germany and other European states. Once pronatalists 
expanded their vision beyond Europe’s borders and conceived of the 
issue in global terms, they began to think differently about how they 
would strengthen the French birthrate. For one thing, this “imperial 
turn” in pronatalist thinking generated impassioned arguments in 
favor of developing colonies as a destination for French migration. 
Also, in various colonies this global perspective on French depopu-
lation meant envisioning the growth of certain rival European pop-
ulations and select groups of colonial subjects as part of larger efforts 
to safeguard France’s interests.
Ultimately, by exploring French pronatalists’ complex reasons for 
supporting empire, this study sheds new light on one of the many myths 
that was integral to French imperialism: the idea that the establishment 
of an empire made France’s population one hundred million strong. 
As many scholars have pointed out, the empire represented more than 
vast expanses of land of geopolitical and economic importance; the 
empire brought some sixty million colonial subjects under the French 
flag, thereby representing a valuable population reservoir.37 One early 
proponent of the “population reservoir” theory was Charles Mangin, 
who in his 1910 book La force noire argued that West Africa’s abun-
dant population, which he grossly overestimated, could provide much- 
needed soldiers for depopulated France’s army.38 Soon after, the benefit 
to the metropole of this population became readily apparent when 
large numbers of colonial soldiers fought in the French army during 
the Great War, filling the void left by those Frenchmen who had never 
been born.39 During this same war, other men from France’s African 
and Asian colonies arrived in the metropole to fill the labor shortages 
created by the departure of many working- class men to the front.40
While many contemporaries may have had their reservations about 
the demographic value that the colonies represented for the metro-
pole in this respect, it is important to remember that few pronatalists 
regarded France’s colonial subjects as anything more than a tempo-
rary solution to France’s demographic troubles. In fact, the idea of 
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being permanently reliant on colonial subjects to fill France’s popu-
lation void elicited numerous comparisons with ancient Rome. This 
comparison was not surprising given that, as Patricia Lorcin and Jon-
athan Gosnell have shown, French imperialists often presented the 
French empire as the next great Latin empire, continuing where ancient 
Rome had left off in not only Gaul, but also North Africa.41 French pro-
natalists made additional historical connections; the French empire 
Fig. 1. “Le péril jaune,” Revue de l’alliance nationale contre la dépopulation, 
July 1928, 208. Reproduced courtesy of the Bibliothèque nationale de France.
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was not only “descended” from that of Rome but was threatened by a 
depopulation crisis similar to that which had weakened Rome.42 Like 
France, Rome had been obliged to import foreign workers because of 
a labor shortage, the Roman countryside became subject to “peace-
ful colonization” by foreigners, and Rome increasingly relied on colo-
nial soldiers to maintain the large empire that could not be defended 
with Roman soldiers alone. Drawing on the example of ancient Rome, 
French pronatalists were convinced that the loyalty of colonial sol-
diers could never be truly ensured and that being outnumbered by, 
and excessively reliant upon, France’s colonial subjects was a sign of 
weakness, not a solution to depopulation.43 Even if pronatalists saw 
some advantages to drawing on the demographic resources of the 
colonies during times of crisis, occasionally filling the ranks of the 
army and supplying workers to factories, their racial views led them 
to reject any notion of depending on non- European populations to 
compensate for France’s low fertility. Instead, to pronatalists the demo-
graphic potential of empire resided in another myth, the myth of the 
prolific settler, or a belief that French settlers on average had a higher 
birthrate than their metropolitan compatriots. Ultimately, pronatal-
ists saw the demographic potential of empire less in terms of offset-
ting France’s numerical inferiority by bringing millions of colonial 
subjects under the French flag, and more as an important step on the 
road to encouraging a more robust French population growth, both 
in the settler communities and the metropole.
Methodology and Chapter Outline
Given the prevalence of demographic anxieties in Third Republic France 
and the sheer number of people who in one way or another engaged 
this question, it can be challenging to determine who was a pronatal-
ist and what this label meant. Three considerations must therefore be 
kept in mind. First, it is important to recognize that the term prona-
talist can be broadly applied to encompass individuals who, though 
not members of pronatalist organizations, were nevertheless involved 
in causes intersecting with demographic questions, something that 
led them to collaborate with such organizations or employ pronatal-
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ist rhetoric in their own arguments. For instance, activists seeking the 
abolition of regulated prostitution saw their cause as a moral crusade 
against a practice that corrupted men and degraded women; more-
over, they presented regulated prostitution as a cause of depopulation 
due to its association with adultery, the spread of venereal disease, and 
women engaging in non- procreational sex.44 In addition to social- 
reform movements can be added the Roman Catholic Church, whose 
leaders, cognizant of the declining influence of religion in French soci-
ety, presented depopulation as the consequence of a secular govern-
ment and a less observant population. They joined many pronatalists 
in asserting that religious faith was critical to replacing decadence and 
individualism with notions of morality and duty. Although the pro-
natalist movement was by and large male- dominated, in that its lead-
ers were men and its committees predominantly composed of men, 
feminists were very assertive in demanding that pronatalists consider 
women’s opinions. They were quick to emphasize the absurdity of a 
group of men assembling to develop recommendations on breast- 
feeding, maternal health, and child care without including mothers 
in these discussions.45 Many feminists became active members of the 
pronatalist movement, attending meetings and giving presentations 
at pronatalist congresses and, through their activism, emphasizing 
the social importance of women’s political participation.46 To this 
end they presented their own goals, such as state support for moth-
erhood and reforming married women’s legal incapacity, as condu-
cive to improving population growth.47
Despite the multiplicity of voices engaging the demographic debate 
in the metropole, my research revealed that individuals who published 
books about depopulation, were active members of pronatalist orga-
nizations, or were directly involved in promoting colonial settlement 
were the most inclined to present imperialism as a solution to French 
demographic decline. The Catholic Church in France was an active 
participant in discussions about the birthrate, but it largely addressed 
this issue separately from that of empire. Catholic missionaries in the 
empire, though very important in establishing French influence in 
the colonies, seemed similarly disinclined to treat the two questions 
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simultaneously.48 In addition to their active engagement of demo-
graphic questions, feminists were interested in empire, whether that 
meant investigating the condition of colonized women or attempting 
to carve out a greater role for women in the public sphere. Yet, with the 
exception of Mme Léon Pégard, whose work will be discussed exten-
sively in chapter 2, feminists generally treated depopulation and impe-
rialism separately. The most likely reason why feminists and Catholic 
clergy did not articulate the demographic question in this particular 
way is that the birthrate was only one of many issues with which they 
concerned themselves, and they generally only engaged this question 
insofar as it related to their primary objectives. Pronatalist organi-
zations, on the other hand, established with the goal of devoting all 
of their energy to finding ways to improve population growth, were 
subsequently at the forefront of identifying a wide array of potential 
solutions to depopulation, solutions that included colonial emigration 
and drawing inspiration from colonial initiatives. It is for this reason 
that this book focuses mostly on those individuals and organizations 
primarily involved in either promoting colonial settlement or devel-
oping reforms to address French demographic decline.
Second, within the organized pronatalist movement there were many 
different organizations and approaches to achieving the mutual goal of 
stronger demographic growth. For instance, the Ligue pour la vie had 
Catholic roots, whereas the Alliance nationale pour l’accroissement 
de la population française had a strong secular and republican tone 
under the leadership of Jacques Bertillon, though it did move in more 
conservative directions during the 1920s.49 Within these and related 
organizations there was a diversity of opinion as some activists focused 
their energy almost exclusively on finding ways to increase the birth-
rate and others, suspecting that such measures were not particularly 
efficacious, prioritized reforms that would reduce infant mortality. 
Most pronatalists developed agendas combining both approaches, 
and, as will be seen in this study, empire impinged on discussions 
about both decreasing infant mortality and increasing the birthrate.
Also crucial to this study are organizations that were familial-
ist as opposed to pronatalist. According to Paul Smith, one of the 
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key differences between the two ideologies is that pronatalism was 
“quantitative,” in that its adherents sought measures that would boost 
population growth.50 Familialists, on the other hand, were more con-
cerned with the moral quality of the French family and with represent-
ing the interests of the famille nombreuse (large family). Familialist 
organizations typically restricted their membership to people with a 
designated number of children, something that distinguished them 
from the Alliance nationale, and were focused primarily on secur-
ing reforms intended to alleviate the financial challenges of raising a 
large family and to elevate the social importance of fathers of many 
children. These differences aside, familialists and pronatalists shared 
many of the same objectives and collaborated with one another dur-
ing and after the Great War. Pronatalists considered policies extend-
ing financial assistance to large families an integral part of raising 
the birthrate, and they promoted the idea that people who had large 
families deserved to be respected and commended for their sacrifices. 
Familialists shared pronatalists’ concerns about the declining French 
birthrate and lamented how few French people were willing to follow 
their example and have numerous children. It is for this reason that in 
chapters 4 and 5, which focus on the decades after World War I, this 
study utilizes both familialist and pronatalist sources.
The third and final consideration is that pronatalism, as a concept 
and a program for political reform, evolved considerably during the 
seventy years examined in this study. In the first decades of the Third 
Republic, pronatalist reformers built on the existing impetus to reduce 
high rates of infant mortality and saw their greatest success in intro-
ducing legislation designed to protect young children, most notably 
two laws in 1874 that strengthened government oversight of the wet- 
nursing trade and placed restrictions on child labor. In the 1880s and 
1890s, pronatalists increasingly advocated measures that would encour-
age a higher birthrate as opposed to simply reducing child mortality. 
Many of the proposals during this period reflected the growing focus 
on motherhood and aimed to limit how many hours per day women 
could work outside the home, restrict pregnant women’s work before 
and after the delivery, and assist indigent and unmarried mothers. The 
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focus on “protecting” mothers, regardless of the circumstances under 
which they became pregnant, is most evident in the 1912 law allow-
ing recherche de la paternité (paternity suits), a measure that enabled 
unmarried mothers to seek financial support from their child’s father. 
The extreme loss of life during World War I, as well the war’s impact 
on gender roles and family life, marked a new phase in the pronatalist 
movement as it made the depopulation crisis more urgent and compel-
ling to the French public and the nation’s leaders. In addition to seeing 
a growth in their memberships in the aftermath of the war, pronatal-
ists and familialists in the 1920s increasingly asserted that the family, 
as a unit, had rights distinct from the individual, and with such argu-
ments they successfully secured greater benefits and financial advan-
tages for fathers and large families. The new concept of family rights 
was most evident in the campaigns for the family vote in the 1920s 
and 1930s. During this period there was also a renewed emphasis on 
discouraging family planning, most notably with the 1920 legislation 
banning the sale and advertisement of contraceptives and strength-
ening penalties for abortion.51 Generally, the pronatalist movement 
moved in more- conservative directions during these years, partic-
ularly after 1934, when organizations such as the Alliance nationale 
increasingly worked with right- wing groups.52
Using these larger developments as a backdrop against which to 
assess the impact of imperialism on French pronatalism, the chapters 
that follow, organized chronologically, collectively demonstrate that 
pronatalists supported colonial emigration and settlement as solutions 
to French depopulation, studied the pronatalist initiatives of colonial 
administrators, and collaborated with analogous settler organiza-
tions. The first two chapters focus specifically on migration. Chapter 
1 explains how and why settler colonialism became an essential part 
of the pronatalist agenda. It was the desire to establish healthy pat-
terns of migration in order to trigger population growth that turned 
pronatalists into proponents of colonial expansion and settlement. 
This development had its origins in academic debates in the 1860s and 
1870s about the impact of migration on individuals’ family- planning 
decisions. Prominent demographers, led by Louis- Adolphe Bertillon, 
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theorized that colonial emigration improved the demographic health 
of the nation but worried that France lacked a suitable destination for 
its emigrants because few French colonies were located in temperate 
zones where colonists acclimatized easily. This view changed in 1880 
with the publication of Dr. René Ricoux’s statistical study revealing 
that French settlers in Algeria had a birthrate exceeding that of the 
metropole. These findings not only produced more optimistic assess-
ments of France’s prospects for establishing a large settler colony in 
Algeria but also gave birth to the myth of the prolific settler. This 
image of colonial demographic strength was based on gendered ideas 
about individuals’ family- planning decisions that ultimately shaped 
pronatalist arguments in favor of colonial expansion and settlement 
throughout the Third Republic.
Ideas about the causes of depopulation and the demographic ben-
efits of colonial emigration resonated beyond pronatalist circles and 
influenced French efforts to recruit men and women for colonial set-
tlement. As chapter 2 explains, relatively few French people migrated 
to the colonies in the late nineteenth century, a problem that the Union 
coloniale française (ucf) attributed in large part to the low birthrate. 
Focusing on the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century 
when the ucf was active in encouraging migration to the colonies, 
this chapter explores how the ucf expanded the myth of the prolific 
settler by developing ideas about why it was in the colonies that the 
French were likely to achieve what seemed difficult in France: a more 
stable gender order and a higher birthrate. They constructed the male 
colonial settler as a symbolically powerful countertype to the urban, 
metropolitan man who displayed all the wrong qualities thereby con-
tributing to both the low birthrate and France’s failure to settle its col-
onies. Through this image of colonial masculinity, both imperialists 
and pronatalists expressed their class- based and gendered anxieties 
about modernity. Concerns about depopulation also impinged on the 
ucf’s efforts to recruit more women for colonial settlement, leading 
them to focus on women who struggled to find husbands and employ-
ment. In contrast to how the ucf appealed to prospective male set-
tlers, the Société française d’émigration des femmes (sfef) presented 
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itself as a charitable organization that would provide women, who in 
this modern society struggled to fulfill their traditional roles as wives 
and mothers, with jobs in the empire. Although their first priority 
was matching these women with careers, it was expected that women 
would marry soon after arriving in the colonies and that their migra-
tion would contribute to the growth of French settler populations.
As these two chapters indicate, late- nineteenth- century prona-
talists, like many French people, often thought about the empire in 
abstract terms, bringing together diverse peoples and administrative 
units into a single geographic space as they promoted the benefits of 
migration to “the empire.” This vision of the empire was not entirely 
fictional, as the government did take some steps toward centralizing 
the colonial administration in the late nineteenth century by estab-
lishing a ministry of colonies as well as the École coloniale to train 
civil servants for colonial posts.53 In the twentieth century this uni-
fied, abstract idea of empire would be expressed in the term “greater 
France,” the notion of an expanded French nation of which both the 
metropole and colonies were integral parts.
That said, when it came to population policies in the colonies, pro-
natalists were well aware that methods of rule and administration var-
ied substantially from one colony to the next. My research revealed 
that certain colonies were of greater interest and symbolic value to pro-
natalists than were others. This study draws on the example of recent 
studies that focus on the role of select colonies in shaping larger pol-
icy, rather than looking at the empire as a whole or studying a single 
colony in isolation.54 To that end, chapters 3, 4, and 5 are structured 
as case studies focusing on population policies introduced in those 
colonies of particular interest to pronatalists and analyzing how, as 
they developed strategies to encourage French population growth, 
pronatalists understood colonial developments. Although there were 
French settlers all over the empire, and colonial authorities introduced 
pronatalist policies in a number of different places, the developments 
in colonies such as French West Africa seemed to generate relatively 
little interest among French pronatalists.55 In fact, pronatalist dis-
cussions of empire mostly focused on four places: Algeria, Tunisia, 
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Morocco, and Madagascar. That Algeria would play a role in shap-
ing French pronatalism is not surprising given that this colony was 
always exceptional in the French colonial imagination. Its conquest, 
initiated in 1830, marked the beginning of France’s pursuit of a new 
empire. By the Third Republic the colony was seen as part of France 
due to its administrative assimilation, its large French settler popu-
lation, and its proximity to the metropole. For the purposes of this 
study, Algeria was an important destination for French colonial emi-
grants, although pronatalists did envision French settlement of other 
colonies as well, and, even after French colonial migration declined 
in the early twentieth century, settlers in Algeria continued to shape 
larger debates about family rights in the 1920s and 1930s. Also sig-
nificant to French pronatalists were Tunisia and Morocco. Joining 
France’s empire in 1881 and 1912, respectively, these two protector-
ates were frequently associated with Algeria, as all three formed part 
of France’s North African empire. Morocco and Tunisia were never-
theless seen in a different light, since they had fewer settlers and were 
administered indirectly, with residents- general reporting to the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. As that relationship suggests, these protector-
ates were never imagined as an extension of France or even as colonies 
properly speaking. Still, they, like Algeria, were considered suitable 
for more extensive French settlement and played an important role in 
interwar debates about family rights and suffrage reform. Madagas-
car, seemingly the outlier in this study, being much further away from 
the metropole and a less popular destination for French migrants, was 
nevertheless significant because of the pronatalist decrees introduced 
there in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This col-
ony joined the empire in 1896 and was ruled directly, unlike Tunisia 
and Morocco, with an appointed governor- general reporting to the 
Ministry of Colonies.
Chapter 3 begins in the 1890s, a time when French pronatal-
ists became more organized and sought to develop a comprehen-
sive approach to encouraging population growth, one that initially 
focused on motherhood and protecting young children. For this rea-
son, they took great interest in the work of colonial governments seek-
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ing to increase their respective populations and pave the way for future 
French settlement. The first such colony to shape pronatalism in this 
way was Madagascar. Declaring the island “underpopulated” and lack-
ing a sufficient labor force, Governor- General Joseph Gallieni intro-
duced a series of decrees between 1896 and 1905 designed to increase 
the population of the Merina people who lived in the central high-
lands of the island. Like pronatalists in France, Gallieni thought about 
depopulation in gendered terms, targeting Merina men and women 
in different ways and positioning motherhood as a centerpiece of his 
pronatalist decrees. Yet his initiatives were also informed by the colo-
nial context in which they developed as well as his racialized think-
ing. Pronatalists eyed developments in Madagascar with interest and 
saw in Gallieni a “man of action” who was willing to address depopu-
lation in a way that their own government seemed disinclined to do. 
Moreover, they considered Gallieni’s reforms equally applicable to 
their efforts to confront the gendered causes of French racial decline. 
They therefore embraced Gallieni’s population policies, despite the fact 
that these efforts were designed to increase a population that was not 
French. This shows that French pronatalism extended beyond simple 
efforts to increase numbers of French people. Addressing depopula-
tion required solidifying France’s position outside Europe, an objec-
tive that, it was believed, could only be accomplished by establishing 
demographically strong colonies.
By World War I, metropolitan pronatalists had become more suc-
cessful at pushing proposed laws through France’s parliament and wit-
nessed a significant increase in their memberships. Yet, despite these 
achievements, birthrates continued to decline, and the loss of over a 
million young French men during the Great War rendered the prona-
talist movement increasingly desperate to address the crisis by what-
ever means possible. As chapter 4 explains, it was thus in the interwar 
years that redefining citizenship by introducing familial suffrage, a 
system of voting in which parents receive supplemental votes to rep-
resent their children, gained credibility and dominated the pronatalist 
discourse of the period. Although familial suffrage was never enacted 
in France, it was introduced in Tunisia in 1922 and Morocco in 1926. 
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In their decision to implement familial suffrage, French officials in 
Tunisia and Morocco made clear connections between the strength of 
the French settler family and the maintenance of colonial rule. In each 
context, French settlers were outnumbered by both colonial subjects 
and other Europeans. Chapter 4 illustrates how pronatalist objectives 
could be more powerful and politically expedient in a colonial con-
text. To colonial officials, the maintenance of colonial rule required 
encouraging French population growth. Because of the importance 
of the French settler family to these objectives, officials were inclined 
to think about political participation in familial, as opposed to indi-
vidual or egalitarian, terms. This shift in political thought was par-
ticularly significant for metropolitan pronatalists, who urged their 
government to distinguish between male citizens on the basis of their 
contributions to overall population growth.
In the interwar years, the concept of family rights dominated the 
pronatalist movement. As the French state increasingly extended ben-
efits to French families, benefits that many pronatalists considered 
to be fundamental rights, the disparity between raising a family in 
France and raising one in North Africa became all the more evident 
and acute. Chapter 5 explores the emergence of familialist organi-
zations in the North African settler communities after World War I 
and shows how these organizations were focused largely on acquiring 
the same family rights as their compatriots in France. While in the 
nineteenth century pronatalists viewed the settler colonies in North 
Africa to be models of demographic stability, this perception changed 
in the 1920s due to the activism of the familialist movement and stud-
ies revealing a relative reduction in settler population growth. Fears 
of French depopulation in North Africa represented a departure from 
the optimism that Dr. Ricoux’s study had inspired decades earlier; 
yet, pronatalists in France continued to see settler colonialism as an 
important component of their efforts to improve French population 
growth. In fact, during this period, metropolitan pronatalists were 
more interested in empire than ever before. This transformation can 
in part be understood as a reflection of the general growth of interest 
in empire seen in French society during the interwar years. Yet, as this 
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chapter argues, metropolitan pronatalists’ growing commitment to 
empire can be attributed equally to the emergence of settler familialist 
organizations. Despite many similarities between the groups, demo-
graphic concerns in North Africa differed fundamentally from those 
of the metropole. Nevertheless, because of the collaboration between 
these groups, the specific needs and concerns of the settler popula-
tions became part of the metropolitan pronatalist agenda. Studying 
this collaboration reveals, therefore, that French pronatalism should 
not be viewed as an exclusively metropolitan political movement that 
developed solely within France.
The conclusion explores the legacy of the myths, detailed earlier in 
the book, of the prolific settler and the influence of imperialism on indi-
viduals’ family- planning decisions. It begins by looking at the intro-
duction of the Code de la famille, a systematic approach to addressing 
depopulation that was introduced shortly before France’s entrance 
into World War II and foreshadowed the efforts that Vichy officials 
would soon undertake to improve the birthrate and strengthen the 
French family. Following France’s defeat in 1940, the French empire 
represented hope during these uncertain times, just as it had in 1871. 
While Vichy officials attributed French defeat to the inadequacies 
of the Third Republic and the decadence of French society, they saw 
settlers and colonial life in a very different way. Representing health 
and virility, colonial settlers were supposedly untainted by the dec-
adence that characterized metropolitan life and were subsequently 
central to the national regeneration Vichy officials envisioned. Fur-
thermore, despite France’s defeat, many of the colonies were under 
Vichy’s control and remained a symbol of French power. The history 
of colonial pronatalism and its interaction with that of the metropole 
thus sheds considerable light on why pronatalists in both France and 
the settler colonies later embraced Vichy’s National Revolution. Ulti-
mately, as this book demonstrates, pronatalists during and after the 
Third Republic believed that establishing and maintaining large set-
tler colonies was essential to restoring demographic growth and safe-
guarding France’s position in the world.
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